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Abstract
The effect of possible third party settlement on negotiation behaviour
is studied in an economic bargaining experiment. The bargaining phase is
preceded by a production phase that allows for different fairness principles
to guide the division of the total production value. The experimental
results show that a possible third party settlement lowers the dispute costs
by reducing the number of rounds of alternating offers. In the presence of
a third party, negotiators make first offers that are more strongly related
to their production, which reduces the number of rounds of bargaining.
The production phase has an effect on the distributional property of the
settlements. In negotiations where third party settlement is an option, the
negotiation outcome shifts towards a more unequal outcome, more in line
with each person’s contribution.
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1 Introduction
Many decisions are reached in negotiations under the fall back of a third party
settlement. Civil disputes can be brought to court, disputes arising under com-
mercial contracts may be solved by arbitration proceedings, and conflicts between
branch managers can be decided by a senior manager. The main question ad-
dressed in this paper is to what extent the possibility of submitting a case to an
impartial third party for settlement influences the bargaining efficiency and the
distributional properties of the settlements. The effects are studied in a labora-
tory experiment with business school students. The negotiations studied in this
paper are such that two parties must agree upon the division of a sum of money
created through individually produced output. The bargaining process is costly
and may go on until no money is left on the table. I compare negotiations with
and without the option to unilaterally submit the case to an impartial third party.
There are three possible outcomes in the game: an agreement about a division
of the money, a final third party settlement, or a perpetual disagreement. The
game studied is based on the alternating offer bargaining protocol extended to
include the outside option of using a third party to make a final decision.
Experimental studies of sequential bargaining show that concerns for fair-
ness influence bargaining behaviour (Ochs and Roth, 1989; Weg, Rapoport, and
Felsenthal, 1990; Bruyn and Bolton, 2008). In these experiments the players are
asked to negotiate the division of a fixed amount of money over a few rounds
of offers. The experimenter induces differences in the individual discount rates
which, according to the standard model, should give an unequal division of the
money. The experimental results show, however, that players tend to favour an
equal distribution of money. Even in experimental situations where one of the
negotiators has all the bargaining power (dictator game), a third of the par-
ticipants typically divide equally (Camerer, 2003). The strong tendency for an
equal split in these bargaining contexts may be driven by the widely accepted
fairness principle of an equal split when no entitlement to the money exists. The
experiment reported in this paper is designed to create different entitlements to
the endowment through a real effort production phase before negotiations take
place. The experimental results show that a player with a higher production gets
on average a larger share of the money. In the presence of a third party, the
distributional property of the settlements shifts towards a more unequal outcome
that is more in line with each person’s contribution.
Experimental studies of arbitration typically find that dispute rates more than
double when conventional arbitration is introduced into negotiations (Ashenfel-
ter, Currie, Farber, and Spiegel, 1992; Bolton and Katok, 1998; Charness, 2000;
Dickinson, 2004).1 In the experiment reported here the introduction of an option
to let a third party decide significantly lowers the dispute costs by reducing the
1With the exception of Charness (2000), these other studies do not apply the alternating offer
protocol and the negotiation process is not costly, but money is lost in the case of disagreement.
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number of rounds of alternating offers. The reduction in the number of rounds
of bargaining can be explained by negotiators making first offers that are more
strongly related to their production when in the presence of a third party. The
introduction of a third party therefore influences both the efficiency and the dis-
tributional properties of negotiations.
More details of the experimental design are presented in Section 2. Section 3
contains a theoretical analysis based on standard bargaining models. The exper-
imental results are discussed in Section 4, and the relation to the experimental
bargaining literature is provided in Section 5. Some concluding remarks are given
in Section 6.
2 Experimental design
The experiment contains four phases: a production phase, a dictator phase, a
negotiation phase, and a question phase. Participants are provided with the basic
design of all four phases at the beginning of the experiment (complete instructions
are provided in an online supplement). There are two experimental treatments,
and the participants are randomly selected into one of the two treatments. Those
that act as third parties are also randomly selected among the participants. Third
parties do not participate in the production or dictator phase in order to not
bias their view. Instead, they spend their time answering questions on four
hypothetical cases that are similar in structure and information to the real cases
that they meet later in the experiment.
In the dictator and negotiation phases, the participants are randomly matched
in pairs and each person is involved in four situations in the dictator game and
four negotiations. Pairs are rematched between each situation. Participants in
each session are randomly seated in separate cubicles; all interaction between
participants is anonymous and made through a web interface developed for the
experiment (selected screenshots are provided in an online supplement).2
Payment in the experiment is determined for each participant by a random
draw from the four situations in the dictator phase or the four situations in the
negotiation phase that the participant has been involved in. The participant is
paid according to the result he or she achieved in the situation that is drawn. If
there is a third party involvement, the participant is paid according to the third
party decision net of third party costs. A third party is paid a fixed amount
of compensation by the experimenter, independent of his or her choices in the
experiment or whether the service is used at all. In many third party institutions
‘Dispute rates’ refers to the fraction of bargains where no agreements have been made after a
fixed time period.
2The experiment is programmed in Python, and uses a MySQL database and an Apache
web server application. The experiment is run on laptop computers that communicate over a
wireless local area network.
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such as commercial arbitration, a third party is normally paid by the parties for
the time used to settle the dispute. The choice of a fixed sum communicated to
the third parties upfront was made in order to make incentives clear and unbiased
with respect to the uncertain demand for their service in the experiment. At the
end of the experiment, each participant is asked to complete a form using a
code given on the screen and the payment attached to that code is transferred
to the participant’s bank account. Matching of the receivables and the bank
account details is done by a person outside the research group who has no other
information about the experiment.
In the production phase of the experiment all negotiators produce individually
an output by copying text for 10 minutes on the computer. The production phase
has been designed to create individual entitlements to the money. Individual
production is rounded off to the nearest 50 correct words typed. Individual i’s
production value yi is equal to eipi, where the number of words typed is ei, and the
price pi is either NOK 0.75 or 1.50 per correct word.
3 The prices are randomly
distributed to players by the experimenter after typing has ended.4 The total
production value to be divided in a negotiation is equal to Y = y1 + y2.
There are at least three salient fairness principles, mn where n = E,L, P ,
which can guide the individual in dividing the total production value. The first
principle is strict equality which is simply an equal split of the joint production
value, mE = Y/2. The second principle is a laissez-faire principle which gives
each individual what he earns in the production mL = eipi, and the third principle
is a proportionality principle which allocates the joint production according to the
relative production of words such that individual i gets mP = (ei/(e1 + e2))Y . A
principle of proportionality under which the input–output ratio is equal between
people is often called the equity principle or the accountability principle (Konow,
1996). It is a widely held principle, especially in contexts of production (Konow,
2000).
In the dictator phase of the experiment, participants are randomly matched
in pairs and one participant is chosen to act as a dictator who decides on the
division of the production value, Y , between the two. The participant acting
as a dictator is given full information about both participants’ production of
words and the randomly assigned prices. Each participant is involved in a total
of four dictator situations, two as a dictator and two as a passive receiver, all
randomly matched pairs. The dictator game represents a situation comparable
to negotiations where one of the players has all the bargaining power and there
is no strategic element to the distributive choice. Information from the dictator
situations is used to explain behaviour in the negotiations.
3At the time of the experiment USD/NOK = 6.9
4Before the production phase all participants are told that they will earn money according
to the number of correct words that they type, but that the payoff from the experiment will
depend on the subsequent phases. To avoid incentive effects, prices are assigned after the
production.
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In the negotiation phase of the experiment, participants are again randomly
matched in pairs and they are instructed to bargain over the division of the
production value, Y . The bargaining protocol is an alternating offer bargaining
with infinite horizon.5 Both participants are induced with an equal discount
factor, δ = 0.96, such that the value of the production shrinks by the same
amount for both negotiators. Money at the negotiation table in round t is equal
to δt−1Y . One of the participants in a pair is randomly assigned as the first
mover and proposes an opening offer in the first round, t = 1. An offer from
individual i is an amount of money xi to himself and Y − xi, to the other party.
In treatment I, called the bargaining treatment, the second mover responds to an
initial offer either by accepting it and the negotiation is closed without cost, or
by making a counteroffer in the second round (t = 2) where the production value
is reduced by 4%. The negotiation is closed when one party accepts an offer.6
The pairs of participants are rematched between each negotiation and all players
take part in four negotiations. Participants are given full information about the
other participants’ production of words and the prices assigned to each in the
bargaining pair. Every offer that is made during the negotiation is recorded in a
table on the screen. Communication between parties is restricted to this minimal
exchange of suggested divisions of the total production value, and acceptance or
rejection of the other’s offer.
In treatment II, called the third party treatment, the bargaining protocol is
changed such that there is an additional option available during the alternating
offers. This is to unilaterally break off the negotiation and request a third party
settlement. Because this extra third party option is only available in the second
treatment and there is random assignment of participants to the two treatments,
the experimental design allows us to study the causal effect of introducing a
third party option. Using a third party costs each negotiator 5%. The cost is
independent of who made the request for the third party settlement. There are
no restrictions on the settlement imposed by the third party other than it has
to be equal to the available sum of money, so that no money can be added or
withdrawn. The third party called upon to make a decision is given all the rele-
vant information about the negotiation, that is, both negotiators’ production of
words, the assigned prices, and the full sequence of offers made by both negotia-
tors including who asked for the third party service. Negotiators are not given
5In principle, the negotiations could continue until the minimum offer of NOK 1 is reached
or the participants could use an excessively long time to decide in each round, never concluding
the negotiation. From previous experience with experiments of this kind, we thought these
events so unlikely that the participants were not informed of how such situations would be
handled. One negotiation lasted for 26 rounds ending with an equal split of the remaining
0.36% of the production. It took 22 minutes to complete this negotiation.
6Every time a choice has been made, participants are informed about the consequences of
their choice, and they are asked whether they would like to revise it before it is transmitted to
the other party.
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information about any decisions made by third parties during the experiment.
After all choices are made, the participants are given three questions about
bargaining and fairness (questions can be found in an online supplement). Figure
1 shows the different phases and the two treatments of the experiment for the
negotiators.
Figure 1: Experimental design for negotiators
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a computer for 
10 minutes 
Decide allocation 
between you and  
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Beliefs about the potential outcomes of the negotiations and the third party
decisions are elicited during the experiment. This allows for checking whether
the outcomes are affected by mistaken beliefs about the outcome of negotiations,
for example whether the use of a third party is driven by mistaken beliefs about
the third party decision. Before the first mover sends the initial offer, he is asked
what he believes will be the outcome of the bargaining. The first mover receives
a bonus of NOK 20 if the guess is within a NOK 20 deviation of the actual
agreement made.7 In all cases where a third party settlement is requested, the
participant who requests the third party settlement is asked what he thinks is
the most likely outcome. Participants are paid a bonus of NOK 20 if the answer
is within a NOK 20 deviation of the actual decision made by the third party.
The experiment took place at the Norwegian School of Economics and Busi-
ness Administration in October 2008. Students from the first and second years
of the Master of Science programme in Economics and Business Administration
were invited to participate in an experiment. The invitation explained that the
experiment was voluntary, that they would receive NOK 100 for participating,
and that they would possibly earn more money during the experiment. A total
of 110 students volunteered to participate and they were randomly assigned to
one of six sessions, three sessions for each treatment. There were 28 bargaining
pairs in the pure negotiation treatment and 24 bargaining pairs in the third party
treatment. The 104 negotiators were paid an average of NOK 333 (USD 48.3)
for an experiment that lasted on average an hour and a half. The maximum
7To avoid any strategic behaviour with respect to final offers and the bonus payment, it is
made explicit in the instructions that a negotiator will not receive the bonus if that particular
situation is drawn for payment.
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payment any student received was NOK 600. For the third party treatment, six
of the students were randomly selected to act as a third party. Third parties were
paid a fixed compensation of NOK 300.
3 Theoretical analysis
This section discusses what the expected difference between the two treatments
should be based on standard models of bargaining behaviour. The negotiation
protocol used in the experiment is based on an alternating offer model with an
infinite horizon that has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome (Rubin-
stein, 1982). In the absence of a third party decision, the model predicts the first
mover will offer δ/(1 + δ) to the other player, who should accept. In the experi-
ment, δ is induced to be 0.96 for both players. The first mover should therefore
offer 0.49 to the other participant, who should then accept. A low discount rate
of 4% is chosen in order to reduce the first mover advantage. The Rubinstein
model predicts an outcome of the negotiations close to an equal split with no
variation. An agreement made in the first round is costless and efficient. The
model is based on both players having standard preferences, which are common
knowledge among the players. For small payoffs the utility function can be as-
sumed to be linear in payoffs representing risk neutrality. The production phase
does not enter into the model, which is based on a given endowment to negotiate
over.
The influence of a third party on the negotiations will depend upon the rules
that govern the third party mechanism and the assumptions about the third
party behaviour. Here, negotiators can unilaterally submit the case for a binding
third party decision in any round during the negotiations. A third party can
implement any settlement of the contested amount, but he cannot add or subtract
money. There are different hypotheses about how impartial third parties reach
decisions. Many papers on arbitration assume that the arbitrator will compromise
the final positions of the negotiators. Negotiators will in such a situation tend
to make large demands and small concessions in order to offset the compromise
decision of the arbitrator. Such behaviour would predict increased dispute rates
in negotiations under a possible third party settlement. On the other hand, if
a third party follows a fairness principle in the allocation decision, the effect on
dispute rates may be different. Among the papers that study arbitrator behaviour
empirically, mostly in labour disputes, Bazerman (1985) finds that arbitrators
consistently apply principles in the decisions across different cases, and that there
is variation among arbitrators in which principle they apply, while Bloom (1986)
finds more evidence of compromising behaviour among arbitrators.
Submitting the case to a third party for settlement is an outside option. In
situations where negotiators know with certainty what principle the third party
will use, a rational negotiator with standard preferences should submit the case
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for a third party decision when the payoff from a third party settlement net
of costs is greater than the payoff that would be the outcome of a negotiation.
Because the Rubinstein model predicts an almost equal split, the outside option
will be an empty threat for both players if it is common knowledge that the third
party follows an egalitarian principle. This is because of the cost of using a third
party. Hence, if the Rubinstein model predicts correctly the behaviour of the
players, there should be no difference between the treatments; all negotiations
should end in the first round with an equal split of the money.
If the third party is known to follow either a proportionality or a laissez-faire
principle, the outcome will depend upon the application of these principles in
the specific situation facing the negotiators in the experiment. In a few cases the
production and the price are the same for both negotiators, and an application of
any of the fairness principles will then lead to the same answer—an equal split.
However, in most situations where there are differences in the number of words
produced or the prices assigned, the application of these principles gives more
money to one of the parties. This party could then use this as a credible threat
to get more money out of the negotiation. The other party should recognize
the credible threat and agree on a settlement that follows the principle of the
third party. Hence, if both negotiators know that the third party follows a pro-
portionality or laissez-faire principle, we should expect differences between the
treatments. The distributional properties of the bargaining outcome should on
average be more unequal, reflecting the fact that self-interested negotiators have
a credible outside option threat.
If there is uncertainty about the third party decision then the negotiators
would take this into account. There is an expected gain from submitting the case
to a third party if the expected outcome net of cost is higher than the outcome
from a bargaining agreement. Uncertainty about third party principles should
not in itself change the conclusion about the expected differences between the
treatments.
Rational negotiators with perfect information should agree in the first round,
independently of their preferences and the presence or absence of a third party.
An agreement in the first round is Pareto efficient. A third party may influence
the distribution of the negotiation outcome, but he should not influence bargain-
ing efficiency. Third party arbitration is a costly mechanism; the threat of using
it should be sufficient to influence the outcome and no actual use should there-
fore be observed. However, in many experiments negotiators use multiple rounds
of offers and counteroffers to reach an agreement. Such inefficiencies in nego-
tiations could arise from bounded rationality and uncertainty. The Rubinstein
(1982) solution relies on rationality in the sense that the parties should be able
to solve the problem using backward deduction. It is however well known that
participants in experiments, for example the centipede game, fail in the use of
backward deduction logic (Camerer, 2003). Uncertainty with respect to the other
players’ preferences or motives could also create more rounds of negotiations be-
8
cause negotiators use costly delays to signal to the other party information about
their own reservation value (Ochs and Roth, 1989). Because participants are
randomly assigned to the two treatments, bounded rationality and signalling are
not expected to cause differences in efficiency between the treatments.
4 Experimental results
The experimental results show that both the bargaining efficiency and the distri-
butional properties of the outcome are influenced by the introduction of a possible
third party settlement. The 208 negotiations are summarized for the two treat-
ments in Figure 2. Each point on the graph on the left represents an agreement
from the bargaining treatment with person A’s share of the total production value
on the horizontal axis and person B’s share on the vertical axis. Each point on
the graph on the right represents a settlement from the treatment with an option
to submit the case to a third party, including 15 actual third party decisions. All
the points along the diagonal line from the upper left corner to lower right corner
represent efficient agreements, i.e. agreements made without costs. All the points
that are placed inside this efficiency frontier represent settlements where some of
the production value is lost during negotiation or by the use of a third party. We
can immediately observe that more settlements from the bargaining treatment
are further away from the efficient frontier, indicating a difference in efficiency
between the treatments.
Figure 2: Share of total production value
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Almost half of all the settlements are equal splits.8 There is a difference be-
tween the treatments: 56% of the settlements in the bargaining treatment are
equal splits compared with 34% of the settlements in the third party treatment.
There is also a significant increase in the variance of the share that person A re-
ceives in the third party treatment (p < 0.001, Levene’s test). The most extreme
unequal split is a 20–80 split from the third party treatment.9
4.1 Efficiency in reaching an agreement
Efficiency in reaching an agreement is measured in terms of the reduction in the
production value and actual use of a third party. Dispute cost, c, in the cases
where no third party is used, is equal to one minus the accumulated reduction
in value from the discount factor (c = 1− δt−1, where t is the number of rounds
at the close of an agreement). In the cases where a third party is used, dispute
costs are also adjusted for the third party cost, α, of 10% (c = 1− δt−1(1− α)).
If the second mover accepts the initial offer in the first round, there will be no
dispute cost.
Table 1: Efficiency of settlements by treatment
I: Bargaining II: Third party
Rounds average 3.29 1.33
std. dev. (4.41) (0.75)
Dispute costs average 0.08 0.03
std. dev. (0.13) (0.05)
n 112 96
Table 1 shows that dispute costs are significantly reduced from 8% to 3% in
the third party treatment (p = 0.004, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). The average
number of rounds in the third party treatment is 1.3, which is significantly lower
than 3.3 in the bargaining treatment (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). In
the bargaining treatment, about 20% of the negotiations continue for five rounds
or more; see Figure 3.
The results show that there is a significant improvement in efficiency by mak-
ing available an option to submit the case to a third party. This is in contrast
8In order to accommodate rounding to the nearest NOK 5 and the small first mover ad-
vantage that follows from a theoretical solution, all agreements within a 47.5–52.5 split are
characterized as equal splits. Forty-six per cent of the settlements are within this bound.
9The average split is close to 50–50 for both treatments. Because of the random selection of
pairs in the experiment, a consistent application of any of the principles discussed in Section
3 gives an average of 0.5, but with different variance. The distributional properties of the
agreements are further discussed in Section 4.3.
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with previous experimental studies that find an increase in dispute rates when
a third party is introduced (Ashenfelter et al., 1992; Bolton and Katok, 1998;
Charness, 2000; Dickinson, 2004). These studies typically find that dispute rates
more than double when conventional arbitration is introduced. (There are some
differences in experimental design between these papers that can possibly explain
the different dispute rates; this is discussed in Section 5.)
Figure 3: Rounds of offers in the two treatments
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The first offer is important for the negotiations because it sends a signal about
the preferred outcome and the aggressiveness of the strategy that a negotiator
will employ. The first offers could therefore have a strong impact on the efficiency
of negotiations. The number of rounds that a negotiation takes to complete in the
experiment is significantly correlated with the first offers (p < 0.001, Spearman
rank-order correlation). The main explanation of the reduction in dispute costs
is the sharp decrease in rejections of first offers when introducing a third party
(45% versus 19%).
There is a notable difference in the average share that person A offers in the
first round in the two treatments. The average share that person A offers in
the first round is 8% higher for the third party treatment compared with the
bargaining treatment, which is a statistically significant difference (p = 0.10,
Wilcoxon rank-sum test). The higher offers in the first round, when there is an
option to submit the case to a third party, indicate that there is a difference in
the negotiation strategies employed in this treatment.
In Table 2 the first offer from person A is explained by his relative production
in the pair, and his relative price in the pair. The coefficient for production
would be equal to one if the outcome was proportional to the production of
the negotiators, that is, if the proportionality principle was strictly applied in
the first round. The parameters are estimated using data for the first round of
offers by applying a regression with individual fixed effects. Production and price
are significant explanatory variables in the third party treatment but not in the
bargaining treatment, where the variables have very little explanatory power.
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The introduction of a third party induces the parties to make first offers that are
strongly related to their relative production. Offers that are more strongly related
to production will be closer to an equal split on average because the experiment
is based on a random matching of pairs with a different production of words.
This can explain the increased average share that person one offers in the first
round in the third party treatment.
Table 2: Effect of relative production and price on first offers
T I: Bargaining T II: Third party
Production -0.079 0.732***
(0.363) (0.083)
Price 0.047 0.063***
(0.050) (0.014)
Constant 0.538** 0.077*
(0.215) (0.046)
R2 0.03 0.65
n 112 96/81
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses.***/**/*: 1/5/10% significance.
Regression with individual fixed effects.
Figure 4 shows that there is a strong correlation between what a person ex-
pects will be the outcome from the negotiation and that person’s first offer.
However, in the bargaining treatment, there are a number of observations where
negotiators start out by claiming for themselves a much higher share in the first
offer than they expect will be the outcome, which is not the case for the third
party treatment. The presence of a third party induces negotiators to make first
offers that are more in line with expectations.
There are five first offers of zero to person B in the negotiation phase of
the experiment. All these first offers were made by negotiators who also offered
zero in the dictator game. This indicates that there is consistent behaviour over
the different phases of the experiment. A dummy variable is constructed in
order to check whether the dictator results have predictive power in explaining
the negotiation efficiency. The dummy variable is zero if both of the dictator
decisions are at the same level or higher (by a margin of at least 0.025) than the
lowest offer that follows from the application of any of the principles described
in Section 2; otherwise the dummy variable has a value of one. About one-third
of the negotiators make offers in the dictator game that are lower than what the
most self-serving principle tells them to do. This dummy variable is significantly
correlated with both dispute costs and first offers (p < 0.001, Spearman rank-
order correlation). It seems that inefficiency in negotiations is related to specific
12
Figure 4: Correlation between expected outcome and first offer
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4.2 Distributional properties of the outcome
The distributional properties of the settlements also differ between the two treat-
ments, where there is more inequality in the third party treatment measured
with the Gini index.11 There is a significant increase in average inequality from
7% in the bargaining treatment to 12% in the third party treatment (p = 0.008,
Wilcoxon rank-sum test). This excludes the 15 observations where a third party
decided the settlement. If these observations are included, there is an even larger
increase in the inequality.
The production phase of the experiment has explanatory power for the distri-
butional properties of the negotiation outcome. In Table 3 the share that person
A receives in the agreement is explained by his relative production in the pair,
and his relative price in the pair. The effects are estimated by a regression with
individual fixed effects. Both production and price are significant explanatory
variables in the regressions. We see that the production coefficient is higher
10Charness (2000) finds that different types of negotiators are important for explaining differ-
ences in efficiency. He investigates the influence of social preferences in a bargaining experiment
with screening of participants into two groups based on their generosity in a dictator game (giv-
ing more or less than 30%). The sorting of participants into bargaining pairs reduces overall
dispute costs, primarily because of a reduction in these costs when two generous types are
paired together.
11The Gini index is zero for an equal split and one for a split where one player receives
everything. The result is robust for other measures of inequality.
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in the third party treatment, which indicates that there are more agreements
closer to the proportionality principle in this treatment. However, a regression
with an interaction term for production and treatment (the third column) shows
that the importance of relative production is not statistically significant between
treatments.
Table 3: Effect of relative production and price on agreements
TI TII TI & TII
Bargaining Third party Negotiation
Production 0.571*** 0.696*** 0.542***
(0.094) (0.113) (0.117)
Price 0.061*** 0.048** 0.054***
(0.013) (0.019) (0.011)
Prod. × treat. 0.156
(0.147)
Constant 0.149*** 0.102 0.136***
(0.055) (0.062) (0.044)
R2 0.418 0.45 0.439
n 112 96 208
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses.***/**/*: 1/5/10% significance
Regression with individual fixed effects.
Before person A chooses a first offer, he is asked about the amount of money
he expects to end up with in the agreement. There is no significant difference
between the treatments in the expected outcome. However, the inequality of the
expected agreement in the bargaining treatment is 11%, significantly higher than
the 7% for the actual agreements in that treatment (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test). It seems that the negotiators do not fully expect the more equal
distribution in the bargaining treatment. For the third party treatment there is
no statistically significant difference between the average expected outcome and
the average actual outcome.
The dictator game results show that the participants to a large extent also
chose to divide the production value according to each person’s contribution
when they had all the bargaining power. The coefficient estimate for production
is 0.8 in Table 4, which indicates that offers are made close to the proportionality
principle.12
12On average the participants offer 39% of the total production to the other player in the
dictator game. The average offer to the other person in this dictator game is higher than typical
dictator games where the average offer is about 20% of dictator endowment (Camerer, 2003).
The higher average offer in a context with a real effort production phase is in line with the
results of Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2007).
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Table 4: Effect of relative production and price on dictator decisions
Dictator
Production 0.802***
(0.135)
Price 0.052***
(0.019)
Constant 0.150*
(0.077)
R2 0.141
n 208
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses.
***/**/*: 1/5/10% significance.
4.3 Third party behaviour
In a questionnaire, all of the six participants who acted as third parties pre-
ferred the proportionality principle. Four of them also answered that they would
consider the strategy of the negotiators in their evaluation, saying they would al-
locate less to negotiators that were offering less than what was reasonable. Two
arbitrators said that they would follow a rule that deducted all the dispute cost
from the one who had offered less than what they perceived as fair, reasoning
that he was responsible for the dispute costs. Seven of the 15 third party deci-
sions were settled close to an application of a proportionality principle, and the
other eight seemed not to follow a strict interpretation of a principle. All the
third parties considered their role as an impartial third party to be to find a fair
solution, and only one mentioned that a third party mechanism may foster faster
decisions and improved efficiency.
The hypothesis that the third party mechanically compromises the final offers
is not supported by the data. The final offers seem to have little direct influence;
only in four cases are the settlements close to one of the parties’ final offers.
There are seven cases of third party settlements outside of the final offer from
the negotiators.
Incorrect beliefs about the third party behaviour, for example excessive op-
timism about the outcome of a third party award, could cause the use of an
expensive third party mechanism that would not have been used if the beliefs
were correct (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). In the experiment, the partic-
ipant who requests the third party is asked about what he believes will be the
decision of the third party. As only 15 cases here were decided by a third party, we
should be cautious interpreting this data, but the average belief about the third
party decision is not significantly different from what the third party actually
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decides. More than half of the participants’ subjective beliefs are within a 10%
deviation from the third party decisions, and there is no evidence of systematic
deviation of the beliefs about the third party decision.
4.4 Negotiators’ answers to questionnaire
To understand what the participants think about fairness and bargaining, a short
questionnaire was given to the negotiators after all the negotiations were com-
pleted. The first question given to the negotiators contains a brief description of
a negotiation problem illustrated with three examples, similar to the actual cases
that the participants experienced during the experiment. The answers show the
largest support among the negotiators for the principle of proportionality, fol-
lowed by the laissez-faire principle. Only 4% of the participants favour a strictly
egalitarian division of the production value; see Table 5. These numbers seem
to be biased by the actual experience during the experiment because the pro-
portionality principle is favoured by 77% of those who participated in the third
party treatment, and by only 57% of those who participated in the bargaining
treatment, and there is a corresponding change in the support for the laissez-faire
principle. The higher support for the laissez-faire principle in bargaining may
reflect the self-serving use of such a principle during the bargaining treatment
and a justification of this in the questionnaire.
Table 5: Preferred fairness principle
I: Bargaining II: Third party
Proportional to production 57% 77%
Laissez-faire principle 39% 19%
Equal division 4% 4%
n 56 48
The second question is related to whether they find it acceptable to use fair-
ness or power in negotiations. The question is the same as that used by Binmore,
Swierzbinski, Hsu, and Proulx (1993), who find that 35% say that one ought to
play fair. Here, 57% of the negotiators in the pure bargaining treatment say that
one ought to play fair compared with 69% of the negotiators in the third party
treatment. The rest say that it is acceptable to use one’s bargaining power. The
experimental design differs from that of Binmore et al. (1993), and the larger sup-
port for fair play is probably because of the inclusion of a real effort production
phase.
The third question relates to the use of bargaining strategies. Negotiators are
asked to rank four alternative strategies according to what they think is the most
important in negotiations in order to reach an agreement where they achieve their
own goals. The results show that having a strong opening position is given the
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best overall rank; see Table 6. Although fairness is important in negotiations,
players’ views are more balanced when a fairness strategy is compared with other
strategies.
Table 6: The importance of negotiation strategies
Rank
A strong opening position 1
Seeking a fair outcome 2
More bargaining power 3
Willingness to make concessions 4
n 104
5 Related literature
This paper is related to several papers that study arbitration in an experimen-
tal setting (Ashenfelter et al., 1992; Bolton and Katok, 1998; Charness, 2000;
Dickinson, 2004). They typically find that dispute rates more than double when
conventional arbitration is introduced into negotiations. An innovative part of
Ashenfelter et al. (1992) is the design where the arbitration decision is imple-
mented as a computer random draw from a normal distribution with equal split
of the outcome as the mean. A bargaining treatment is compared with an arbi-
tration treatment. They measure the dispute rates as the number of negotiations
where no agreement is reached after a fixed time period has elapsed. In the
bargaining treatment, everything is lost after a certain time period, and this is
compared to a forced arbitration settlement. The authors recognize that this ex-
perimental design implicitly raises the costs of no agreement compared with the
treatment with forced arbitration because the likelihood of receiving zero from
arbitration is very small.13 This is different in the experimental design used here.
The third party settlement is not enforced upon negotiators that do not close
before a deadline, but it is a choice for negotiators to call upon a third party at
any time during the negotiation. This implies that a negotiator can, if he believes
that further negotiations would be costly, immediately submit the case to a third
party and save negotiation costs.
Negotiation situations that facilitate the formation of different initial entitle-
ments have been studied by Ga¨chter and Riedl (2005, 2006). They find strong
13It is also the practice in these experiments to show the negotiators previous decisions
by the arbitrator in the form of draws from a normal distribution. This information has
potentially little value because there is nothing about the background history of offers or possible
entitlement claims that the arbitrator would consider before a decision is reached. In the
experiment reported here no information is provided about the arbitrators except that they are
randomly drawn from among the participants in the room.
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effects of entitlements on bargaining behaviour in an experiment where partici-
pants know whether they rank above or below the median answer to a general
knowledge quiz. They find that most of the participants choose to split the en-
dowment after a loss proportional to the entitlements that are suggested to them
before the loss occurs. Ga¨chter and Riedl (2006) find that proportionality is
preferred in a questionnaire survey and that equality is more prevalent in actual
negotiations.
The overall importance of entitlement in negotiations is confirmed in the ex-
periment reported here. The literature has shown that proportionality is a strong
principle held by many people in production contexts. The introduction of a third
party settlement option induces the negotiators to change their strategy so that
the offers are even more proportional to individual production. This paper adds
to the literature by showing that a third party settlement option can increase the
efficiency of bargaining in the sense of reducing the costs associated with rounds
of alternating offers.
6 Concluding remarks
The costs associated with transactions in the broad sense constitute a large share
of the economy, and the efficiency of institutions that facilitate transactions is of
great importance for economic performance (North, 1990). Substantial resources
are devoted to the formation and enforcement of contracts, and the resolution
of disputes through arbitration, mediation and, of course, the legal system. It is
important to build institutional arrangements that provide flexibility for people
to negotiate their own solution, but at the same time provide efficient mechanisms
to settle bargaining impasses.
The experimental results showed that both the negotiation efficiency and the
distribution of payoffs are affected by the introduction of a third party. There
is a significant reduction in dispute costs with the possibility of third party set-
tlement. The introduction of a choice of a third party solution reduced dispute
costs, primarily because it allows negotiators to cut short unfair treatment. The
experiment provided an example of a third party mechanism that reduces the
dispute costs, which is in contrast to the previous literature on arbitration. An
implication for the efficiency of the design of a third party mechanism is that the
option to submit the case to a third party should be available throughout the
entire negotiation process, and not only after a period of time has elapsed. This
ensures negotiators cut short unfair demands that would possibly lead to long
and costly negotiations.
The efficiency gain from an option to use a third party is accompanied by
an increase in the inequality of the distribution of gains, more in line with each
person’s contribution. The change in the distributional properties of the outcome
that results from the introduction of a possible third party settlement raises a
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normative question of whether it is acceptable to influence the settlements such
that other allocations are implemented than would result from negotiations be-
tween the parties without interference. In the experiment reported here, third
parties favoured a fairness principle that was supported by a majority of negotia-
tors. But the principle that a third party apply can run counter to the principle of
fairness that has a broader legitimacy in society. Dworkin (2006) argues that legal
theory at the adjudicative stage should require judges not only to uphold values
of efficiency and coordination, but also to look to morality to decide the law. An
important question then becomes the selection procedures of third parties.
Throughout the paper, we assumed that the parties agreed on the use of
a specific third party mechanism. To agree on the use of such a mechanism
during contracting is a negotiation in itself. It would therefore be interesting for
further research to investigate how the commitment to the use of a third party in
the contract phase influences the post-contractual negotiation behaviour under
possible third party settlement.
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Appendix A Instructions
This supplement contains all the instructions read to the participants during the exper-
iment. The four subsections follow the structure of the experiment explained in Section
2 of the paper. This supplement contains instructions for both treatments. For the bar-
gaining treatment, the instructions can be read by using all the text in square brackets
and deleting all the text in curly brackets, and vice versa for the third party treatment.
The instructions were given in Norwegian. The translation is by the author.
General introduction
Welcome to this experiment. My name is (. . . ) and I will guide you through the
experiment. The results from the experiment will be used in a research project, and it
is therefore important that you all stick to the rules that have been distributed:
• You should not talk to other participants.
• If you have questions or problems during the experiment, raise your hand and
we will come to you.
• You should not open other web pages.
If you breach these rules, you will have to leave the room. There will be pauses during
the experiment and it is important that you sit still and keep quiet during these.
You will be completely anonymous in the experiment. You will not at any time be
asked about who you are. It will not be possible for us or the other participants to find
out which choices you have made. You will be asked to make choices in several different
situations in this experiment. For every situation, you will be randomly connected to
another person in this room. Your actual payment will be determined as follows: we
randomly draw one of the situations you were involved in and pay the amount of
money you received in that situation. The choices that you make will not influence
which situation is drawn; it will be an entirely random draw and there is an equal
chance for all situations to be drawn. You should therefore think about each situation
as if it is the one that determines how much you earn.
When the experiment is finished, you will see a payment code on the screen. You are
asked to write down this code on a form that will be sent to the accounting department
at (. . . ). Employees at the accounting department will receive a list of codes and
amounts from us and match these with the payment instructions from the forms. This
is done so that nobody will know how much you earned.
{There are two different roles in the experiment. Most of you are participants
in negotiations, while some of you are randomly drawn to act as a third party. The
content of the folder shows which role you have been assigned. Negotiators have only
received text marked A or text marked B. Those of you that are third parties have, in
addition to the two pieces of text, received in the folder at your desk a booklet labelled
‘Examples and questions’.}
The experiment consists of four phases. I will now explain the main features of the
experiment. I will stop before we start a new phase and explain in more detail what
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you should do in each phase. In the first phase of the experiment, you should copy text
for 10 minutes in Word. You will be paid a price for each correct word you have typed.
In phase two of the experiment you will be randomly matched with other persons in
this room, and each of you in a pair will choose how much of the combined production
value you will distribute to yourself and to the other person. You will be involved in
four such situations of distribution.
In the third phase of the experiment, you will also be randomly matched with people
in this room. You will then negotiate about the division of the combined production
value by sending proposals to each other until one of you accepts the other’s proposal.
The production value shrinks by 4% every time one of you does not accept the other’s
proposal. {You will also have the opportunity to let a third person in this room decide
the distribution. The third party does not have any other tasks than to decide on
distributions that are sent to him or her.} You will be involved in four such situations
of negotiation. In the last phase of the experiment you are asked to answer a few
questions about the type of situations that you have experienced.
Introduction phase 1
The first thing [you] {negotiators} will do is to copy text from an official report that
is marked with either an A or a B, and which you will find in the folder on your desk.
You will copy the text into Word when I tell you to start. I will tell you when 10
minutes have passed and everybody must then stop. You will be paid for each correct
word you type. You may use the spellchecker in Word.
{Some of you will be drawn to act as a third party and you will make decisions in
particular situations if other participants request this later in the experiment. Those
of you who are third parties should first read through the four examples of negotiation
that are in the folder, and then answer the five questions in the folder. The answers
should be written in Word at the same time the others copy text. The third parties will
later be asked to provide answers to the questions on their screen. Those who are third
parties will receive 300 kroner for the job. This amount is fixed and is not influenced
by what you do in the experiment.}
{To everybody,} I remind you that you should raise your hand if you have any
problems or questions, and then one of us in the research group will come and help
you. You can now open a new document in Word and we will soon start to type. You
can start typing now .
Everybody must now stop typing. [You] {Those of you that are negotiators} should
now highlight all the text typed and copy it to the window in the Mozilla browser, then
click on the button marked ‘submit text’. {Those of you who are third parties should
not do anything now; however, you will later be asked to submit your answers to the
questions.}
After having submited the text you will see a screen that shows how much you
have produced and the value of your production. The production is rounded off to the
nearest 50 words. Half of [you] {negotiators} have copied text marked A, which is an
excerpt from an official report on the merger of the telecoms, IT, and media sectors.
You will receive one krone and 50 oere for each correct word you have typed. The
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other half of [you] {negotiators} have copied text marked B, which is an excerpt from
an official report about Norwegian performing art. You will receive 75 oere for each
correct word you have typed. These prices are randomly determined by us. Finally,
click on the button marked ‘continue’.
Introduction phase 2
[You] {Negotiators} will now be randomly matched with other people in this room. In
each situation of distribution you will not know who the other person is, and the other
person will not know who you are. You will be informed about how many words he
or she has produced and what price each of you has randomly been allocated. You
will then choose a distribution of the combined production value between you and the
other person. Remember that this is real money and the way that you divide the
money determines how much you earn and how much the other person earns. You will
be asked to make decisions in two such situations of distribution. In two other situations
of distribution, another person will decide how much he or she will distribute to you.
After you have registered the distribution, you will see a new screen where you are
asked either to confirm the distribution or to go back and change the distribution. When
you have confirmed your choices, you will receive a message that you have finished the
second phase of the experiment. You should then quietly wait for all the other people
in the room to finish making choices in their situations. On the computer you will soon
see a screen with the first situation and you can then start making choices. {Third
parties can continue and will later be asked to deliver the answers.}
Introduction phase 3
Everybody has finished the second phase and I shall now explain what you will do in
the third phase of the experiment. [You] {Negotiators} will this time also be randomly
matched with other people in this room. In each situation of negotiation you will not
know who the other person is and the other person will not know who you are. You
will be informed about how many words the other person has produced and what price
he or she has randomly been allocated. One of you is randomly drawn to make the first
proposal for division of the combined production value. The proposal will be sent to
the other person and he or she has [two] {three} choices: to accept your proposal or to
make a new proposal for division {, or to decide that the distribution will be determined
by a third person in the room}. New proposals are sent back and forth until one of
you chooses to accept the proposal {or to give a third party the task of deciding the
distribution}. Every time one of you does not accept the proposal for division, but
comes up with a new proposal, the remaining production value will be reduced by 4%.
{If you choose to let a third party decide the distribution, the remaining production
value is reduced by another 6%, in total 10%. Third parties will have information about
both participants’ production and negotiation history.} Everybody will be involved in
four such situations of negotiation.
In some situations you will be asked what you think will be the final outcome of the
negotiation {and how a possible third party will divide the amount}. If your answer is
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within a deviation of plus or minus 20 kroner of the actual result, you will receive 20
kroner in extra payment, with one exception: if you guessed the negotiation result in a
situation, and this particular result was randomly drawn, you will not receive the extra
payment for a correct guess but only the payout in this situation. You will also be
asked to state how certain you are about your guess. Your answer should be given in
terms of a certainty percentage, that is, a number between 0 and 100. It is important
that you write a high percentage if you are certain that this will be the result, and a
low percentage if you are uncertain if this will be the final result.
{Those of you that have been drawn to be a third party will within the next 10
minutes copy the answers to the questions from Word into the window on the browser.
You will also paste your proposal for division of the four examples from the folder.
When you have done that, click on ‘submit answer’ and you will be asked to wait until
possible situations arise in which you are asked to decide. After a short period of time
you will see these situations on the screen and you can then start to decide on the
distributions.}
On the computer [you] {negotiators} will soon see a new screen with the first
situation and you can then start to negotiate. When the situation is accepted {or one
of you has chosen to have a third party decide the situation}, you will automatically
get a new situation to negotiate. When you have finished all the negotiation situations,
you will be asked to wait until everybody has finished their choices.
Introduction phase 4
Everybody has finished and we will soon draw the situation that will decide your
payment from this experiment. First, we ask you to answer a few questions. Soon you
will see a new screen with information about the first question. You should click on
the button marked ‘go forward’ when you have read the information and thereafter you
should answer all the questions.
Closing and payment
Everybody has now answered the questions. You will soon see a screen that informs
you about which situation has randomly been drawn, and how much you earned in this
situation. This screen will be open for 45 seconds. Thereafter you will automatically
be forwarded to a new screen, which only contains a payment code.
Everybody now has a screen with the payment code. Write down this payment
code on the form that you find in the folder next to you. On the form also write down
your name and bank account details. Put the form in the envelope and place it in the
box by the door when you leave the room.
The experiment is now finished and, on behalf of the research team, I thank you
again for your participation in this experiment.
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Appendix B Questionnaire
This supplement contains questions given to negotiators after the experiment had ended.
The questionnaire was given Norwegian. The translation is by the author.
Information
Person A and person B have produced a good or a service with a total value of 1000
kroner. The value of A’s and B’s production is determined by how much effort they have
exerted and the price that they receive for what they have produced. The individual
effort is determined both by how hard each has worked and by the individuals’ skill in
this type of work. The price is randomly determined and cannot be influenced by the
individual.
Below you can see an example of such a situation. Click on the button below to see
more examples. You will thereafter be asked to state what you think is the fairest way
of dividing the combined production value. Note that the combined production value
in all of the examples is 1000 kroner.
Production You The other person
Effort 200 units 200 units
Price of effort 4 kr 1 kr
Production value 800 kr 200 kr
Table 7: Example 1
Production You The other person
Effort 800 units 200 units
Price of effort 1 kr 1 kr
Production value 800 kr 200 kr
Table 8: Example 2
Production You The other person
Effort 150 units 400 units
Price of effort 4 kr 1 kr
Production value 600 kr 400 kr
Table 9: Example 3
Question 1
Now mark the principle that you think gives the fairest division in these types of
situations. How would you divide the total production value between you and the
other person?
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◦ Divide equally
◦ Divide proportional to individual production value
◦ Divide proportional to individual effort
Question 2
Is this the sort of situation in which people ought to play fair or is it socially acceptable
to use whatever bargaining power one has?
◦ Use bargaining power
◦ Play fair
Question 3
Rank from 1 (very important) to 4 (not so important) what you believe is important in
order to reach an agreement where you achieve your own goals in negotiations. Write
a number from 1 to 4 in all the boxes below. You cannot write the same number in
more than one box.
 You are willing to make concessions
 You have more bargaining power
 You seek a fair outcome
 You have a strong opening position
Questions for third parties only
1. What do you think explains why a person would let a third party decide the
outcome of a negotiation?
2. Which aspects of these negotiations would you emphasize as a third party? (refers
to four detailed examples on negotiations that are presented in writing)
3. Why would you emphasize these aspects?
4. How do you think the possibility of letting a third party decide the outcome of
a negotiation influences the proposals made by the parties during a negotiation?
5. Will the proposals that the parties have made during the negotiation influence
your judgement as a third party? If so, how?
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Appendix C Selected screenshots
This supplement contains a selection of the screenshots from the experiment. In the
heading of the screenshot there is a reference to the phase of the experiment explained in
Section 2 of the paper. This supplement contains screenshots from both treatments. The
screenshots are in Norwegian. The translation of the main text on the screen follows
below the screenshots. The translation is by the author.
 
Figure 5: Dictator game
Phase II - Distribution (situation 1 of 2)
You and another participant shall divide 600 kroner. You have been drawn to decide the distribution.
You have produced 300 words and are randomly assigned a price of 1.5 kroner per word. The value of your
production is 450 kroner. The other participant has produced 200 words and is randomly assigned a price of
0.75 kroner per word. The value of the other’s production is 150 kroner. The table below gives you an
overview of the situation.
production you the other
words produced 300 words 200 words
price per word 1.5 kr 0.75 kr
production value 450 kr 150 kr
How many kroner will you distribute to yourself and to the other?
Write into the box below the amount you will distribute to yourself and the other. Click on the button marked
with submit distribution.
You receive:  kroner. (The amount must be in whole kroner).
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Figure 6: Information about a bargaining situation
 
Phase III - Information (situation 2 of 4)
You and another participant in this room have been randomly matched. You shall agree about the division of
600 kr.
You have produced 200 words and are randomly assigned a price of 0.75 kr per word. The value of your
production is 150 kr. The other participant has produced 300 words and is randomly assigned a price of 1.5 kr
per word. The value of the other’s production is 450 kr. The table below gives you an overview of the situation.
production you the other
words produced 200 words 300 words
price per word 0.75 kr 1.5 kr
production value 150 kr 450 kr
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Figure 7: Beliefs about the outcome of the bargaining
 
Phase III - What do you think will be the finale division (situation 2
of 4)
Before you choose to send a proposal for division to the other, we ask you to answer what you think will be
your share the final division of 600 kroner in total production value in this situation.
You will receive 20 kroner extra if your answer is within plus or minus 20 kroner deviation from what the
actual division turns out to be. If this particular situation is drawn you will not receive both the earnings in
the situation and the extra earnings.
You receive:  kroner. (The amount must be in whole kroner).
Write down in per cent how sure you are that you will agree about this division.
I am  per cent sure that this will be the result.
production you the other
words produced 200 words 300 words
price per word 0.75 kr 1.5 kr
production value 150 kr 450 kr
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Figure 8: The first offer decision
 
Phase III - Proposal to division (situation 2 of 4)
You and another participant shall together agree on a division of 600 kr.
Every time one of you does not accept the others proposal, but suggests a different division, the total amount
to divide will be reduced by 4 per cent.
The table below shows how much you and the other have produced and which prices that you have been
randomly assigned.
production you the other
words produced 200 words 300 words
price per word 0.75 kr 1.5 kr
production value 150 kr 450 kr
How much do you propose that you receive?  kroner. (The amount must be in whole kroner).
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Figure 9: The reoffer decision in the bargaining treatment
 
Phase III - Response division (situation 1 of 4)
The other proposes that you receive 231 kroner and that he or she receives 300 kroner of the total of 531
kroner to divide. What is your response to this proposal?
If you do not accept the other’s proposal, but make a different proposal, the total amount to divide will be
reduced by 4 per cent to 510 kroner in this round.
◦ I accept the proposal
◦ I propose a different division where I receive  kr.
The table below shows how much you and the other have produced and which prices that you have been
randomly assigned in this situation.
production you the other
words produced 300 words 200 words
price per word 1.5 kr 0.75 kr
production value 450 kr 150 kr
The table below shows what you and the other have proposed in each round.
round to divide you receive the other receives who made the proposal
1 600 600 0 your proposal
2 576 0 576 the other’s proposal
3 553 500 53 your proposal
4 531 231 300 the other’s proposal
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Figure 10: The reoffer decision in the third party treatment
 
Phase III - Response division (situation 1 of 4)
The other proposes that you receive 53 kroner and that he or she receives 500 kroner of the total of 553
kroner to divide. What is your response to this proposal?
If you do not accept the other’s proposal, but make a different proposal, the total amount to divide will be
reduced by 4 per cent to 531 kroner in this round.
If you choose to let a third party decide the division, the total amount that the third party shall divide will be
reduced by 10 per cent to 498 kroner.
◦ I accept the proposal
◦ I give a third party the task of deciding the division
◦ I propose a different division where I receive  kroner.
The table below shows how much you and the other have produced and which prices that you have been
randomly assigned in this situation.
production you the other
words produced 300 words 200 words
price per word 1.5 kr 0.75 kr
production value 450 kr 150 kr
The table below shows what you and the other have proposed in each round.
round to divide you receive the other receives who made the proposal
1 600 0 600 the other’s proposal
2 576 450 126 your proposal
3 553 53 500 the other’s proposal
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Figure 11: Beliefs about the third party decision
 
Phase III - What do you think the third party will do? (situation 4 of
4)
You have chosen to let a third party decide the division of 459 kr. Before that happens we ask you to answer
what you think will be the division that this third party chooses.
You will receive 20 kroner extra if your answer is within plus or minus 20 kroner deviation from what the
third party actually decide.
You receive:  kroner. (The amount must be in whole kroner).
Write down in per cent how sure you are that this is the division that the third party actually chooses.
I am  per cent sure that this will be the result.
The table below shows how much you and the other have produced and which prices that you have been
randomly assigned in this situation.
production you the other
words produced 300 words 200 words
price per word 1.5 kr 0.75 kr
production value 450 kr 150 kr
The table below shows what you and the other have proposed in each round.
round to divide you receive the other receives who made the proposal
1 600 300 300 the other’s proposal
2 576 450 126 your proposal
3 553 253 300 the other’s proposal
4 531 450 81 your proposal
5 510 210 300 the other’s proposal
6 Let third party decide your proposal
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Figure 12: The third party decision
 
Phase III - Information
Two other participants have not agreed on the division of a total production value.
The table below shows what participants 1 and 2 have produced and which prices they have randomly been
assigned.
Production Participant 1 Participant 2
Words produced 200 words 300 words
Price per word 0.75 kr 1.5 kr
Production value 150 kr 450 kr
The table below shows the amounts that each participant has proposed that he or she should receive in each
round.
Round To divide Participant 1 Participant 2 who made the proposal
1 600 600 0 Participant 1
2 576 126 450 Participant 2
3 553 500 53 Participant 1
4 Let third party decide Participant 2
Participant 2 did not accept the offer in round 3 and has decided that you shall decide the division of 498 kr
between the two participants in this situation.
The decision has reduced the amount that you shall divide with 10 per cent.
The amount you choose will not affect your own payment in the experiment.
How much do you decide that participant 1 receives?  kr.
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